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THE SAFETY PROVISIONS IN BRITISH
FACTORY LAW
W. F. Frank*
"It is not made any easier by the fact that most
engineers know no law and, I say it with due re-
spect, few lawyers know much engineering. There
is an almost complete absence of understanding
between the two branches of technology which ap-
proach this difficult question."'
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to describe the most important
safety provisions in British factory law in the light of their
judicial interpretation with a view to bringing out some of the
significant changes in attitude which have taken place in the last
few years. In order to restrict this paper to a managable size
no reference will be made to purely administrative provisions or
indeed to those provisions of substance which have not yet been
extensively considered by the courts.
A discussion of the kind envisaged here cannot proceed in a
legal vacuum and it must therefore inevitably contain some ref-
erence to the common law relating to negligence. This is, of
course, a subject which deserves separate treatment and the
author can only refer readers to the many authoritative works
that are in existence already. 2
At common law an employer owes a duty to his employees to
take reasonable care for their safety. This duty is an implied
duty arising out of the contract of service but it exists also in
tort independently of contract and most actions are brought in
*Dr. Jur., M. Sc. (Econ.), B. Com., LL.B., Head of the Department of
Management and Business Studies, Lanchester College of Technology, Coventry,
England; Member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of Business Law and
its Departmental Editor for Management Law.
1. Viscount Hailsham, 248 HL. Rep. 73, col. 1345 (25th April 1963).
2. Apart from the general works on negligence, see MUNKMAN, EMPLOYERS'
LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW (4th ed. 1959). This book contains a survey of the
position at common law, including also statutory duties. For an up-to-date dis-
cussion of the whole field, see FRIDMAN, THE MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
(1963). Pain, The Employer's Duty To Provide a Safe System of Work, 7




fact in tort.3 Lord Wright 4 specified the employer's duty as
consisting of the provision of competent fellow-workers, ade-
quate tools and materials, and a proper system of work and
supervision. While such a specification of the employer's duties
may be convenient for the purpose of exposition, it has its dan-
gers if it is taken to imply that it represents an exhaustive
statement of the employer's obligations and it is perhaps safest
to follow the simple restatement of Lord Somerville5 who said
that "put in its simplest terms the general scope of the duty of
an employer is a duty to take reasonable care in all circum-
stances."
The employer's common law duty to provide for the safety
of his employees is in some respects wider and in others narrow-
er than the duties imposed upon him by various statutes. It is
wider inasmuch as it applies to all employees and to all sorts of
danger, while statutory safety duties are generally restricted to
particular employments and to specified hazards. It is narrower
than his statutory duties since it is not "absolute"; the employer
at common law is only obliged to take such safeguards as are
reasonable in the circumstances, while many of the statutory
duties are absolute and the employer has to protect the ser-
vants' safety whether or not in the circumstances it is reason-
able to expect this of him. The employer when sued for common
law negligence is also able to employ a wider range of defenses8
than is open to him in an action for breach of statutory duty. 7
Lastly, it should be remembered that the common law duties
exist only vis-A-vis the servants of a particular employer and do
not avail independent contractors, while statutory duties fre-
quently exist for the benefit of servants, independent contrac-
tors, and indeed also of persons not employed in the premises
at all.8
The statutory duties which form the subject matter of this
3. For a comparison of the employer's duty in contract and in tort see Mat-
thews v. Kuwait Bechtel Corp., [1959] 2 Q.B. 57.
4. Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co. v. English, [1938] A.C. 57.
5. Cavanaugh v. Ulster Weaving Ltd., [1960] A.C. 145.
6. E.g., the defense of volenti non fit injuria.
7. A breach of statutory duty is always regarded by the courts as negligence.
Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. v. McMullan, [1934] A.C. 1.
8. The duty to fence applies only in respect of workmen whose job it is to
use the particular machine or whose job brings them into its vicinity. It does not
benefit someone who, at the critical time, was not working for the occupier under




paper are those existing under the Factories Act, 1961. 9 This is
a consolidating act which has replaced the earlier Factories Acts
of 1937,10 1948,11 and 1959.12 Any references in this paper to
"the act" must be taken to refer to the 1961 act.
DEFINITION OF A FACTORY
13
A "factory" means any premises in which, or within the
close or curtilage or precincts of which, persons are employed in
manual labor in any process for or incidental to any of the
following purposes:
"(1) the making of any article or part of any article;
"(2) the altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, clean-
ing or washing, or the breaking up or demolition of any article,
or
"(3) the adapting for sale of any article ... being premises
in which... the work is carried on by way of trade or for pur-
poses of gain and to or over which the employer of the persons
employed therein has the right of access or control."'14
In addition to this general definition, the act also enumer-
ates certain other types of premises which are to be treated as
factories, whether or not they are covered by the general defi-
nition.15
The general definition of a factory is based on four criteria,
i.e., (a) the employment in manual labor, (b) one of the proc-
esses enumerated, (c) work carried on by way of trade or for
purposes of gain, and (d) the employer's right of access or con-
trol over the premises.
The premises constituting a factory may be open-air prem-
ises so that a factory is not necessarily represented by a build-
ing. Persons must be "employed" in these premises; thus a pri-
vate workshop used by its owner only would not be a factory,
nor would be a technical school, 16 since the persons engaged in
manual labor in the premises (i.e., the students) are not em-
9. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34.
10. 1 Edw. 8; 1 Geo. 6, c. 67.
11. 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 55.
12. 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 67.
13. See Morrison, What Is a Factory?, 8 INDUSTRIAL L. REV. 37 (1953).
14. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 175(1).
15. Id. at § 175(2).
16. Weston v. London County Council, [1941] 1 K.B. 608.
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ployed there. The fact that the persons employed in the prem-
ises must be engaged in manual labor does not mean that all of
them must be so engaged, provided that the employment of peo-
ple in manual labor is the main purpose for which the premises
are used. Where the employment of persons in manual labor
is merely incidental to another purpose for which the premises
are used (e.g., the employment of a porter in a shop of a firm
of dispensing chemists) ,17 the premises will not be treated as a
factory. In passing it may be noted that nothing in the defi-
nition of a factory restricts it to premises where machinery is
in use. A cobbler's shop where shoes are being repaired by sim-
ple hand-tools would thus be a factory provided always that
persons are employed in these premises.
Coming now to the purpose for which the premises are used,
the main difficulties have arisen in connection with the phrase
"adapting goods for sale." The mere packing of goods will
clearly not be considered an adaptation for sale, but where in
the process of placing goods into containers the commercial
value of the goods is altered (e.g., the bottling or canning of
beer,' 8 or the making up of flowers into wreaths)1 9 there is an
adaptation for sale.
The work in the factory must be undertaken by way of trade
or for purposes of gain. The two objectives have to be read dis-
junctively so that it is not necessary that gain should be coupled
with trade.20 Trade is not synonymous with business, since it
consists of the act of buying and selling while business may be
concerned with the supply of services.
Where a place situated within the boundaries of a factory is
solely used for a purpose other than the processes carried on in
the factory, that place will not be deemed to form part of the
factory, but may be deemed to be a separate factory if it falls
within the general definition of a factory.21 A place situated
within the general confines of a factory will thus not be covered
by the provisions of the act if it is used for a purpose which is
neither directly nor incidentally connected with the main pur-
pose of the factory, this being of course the use of manual labor
17. Joyce v. Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd., [1951] 1 All E.R. 682.
18. Hoare v. Truman, Hanbury, Buxton & Co., [1902] 71 L.J.K.B. 380.
19. Hoare v. R. Green Ltd., [1907] 2 K.B. 315.
20. Stanger v. Hendon Borough Council, [1948] 1 K.B. 571; Harris v. Amery,
[1865] L.R. 1 C.P. 148.
21. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 175(6).
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in one of the specified ways.2 2 A canteen situated in factory
grounds forms part of the factory for the purposes of the act
if it is intended, even if in part only, for the use of manual
workers employed in the factory, 23 but not if it is used solely by
managerial staff.24 A separate workshop for the repair and
maintenance of equipment used in the factory forms part of it, 25
but an office where no manual workers are employed does not.
GENERAL SAFETY PROVISIONS
The general safety provisions of the act are contained in
Part II. Sections 12 to 15 of the act, dealing with the fencing
or guarding of machinery, have given rise to the largest volume
of case law and it is here also that some of the more significant
changes in judicial interpretation may be found.
Five types of equipment must be securely fenced, namely:
1. Every flywheel directly connected to any prime mover
and every moving part of any prime mover ;26
2. The head and tail race of every water wheel and of
every water turbine ;27
3. Every part of electric generators, motors, and rotary
converters ;28
4. Every part of transmission machinery ;29
5. Every dangerous part of any machinery, other than
those mentioned already.8 0
Fencing is not required 1 where the equipment is in such a
22. Street v. British Electricity Authority, [1953) 2 Q.B. 399; Thorogood v.
Van den Berghs and Jurgens Ltd., [1951] 2 K.B. 537 (the oiling and testing of
electric fans used in a margarine factory held to be incidental to the main pur-
pose of the factory).
23. Luttman v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., [1955] 1 Weekly L.R.
980.
24. Thomas v. British Thomson Houston Ltd., [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 67.
25. Thorogood v. Van den Berghs and Jurgens Ltd., [1951] 2 K.B. 537.
26. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 12(1). A prime mover means every engine, motor,
or other appliance which provides mechanical energy derived from steam, water,
wind, electricity, the combustion of fuel or other sources. Id. § 176(1).
27. Id. § 12(2).
28. Id. § 12(3).
29. Id. § 13. Transmission machinery means every shaft, wheel, drum, pulley,
system of fast and loose pulleys, coupling, clutch, driving belt, or other device
by which the motion of a prime mover is transmitted to or received by any ma-
chine or applicance. Id. § 176(1).
30. Id. § 14(1).
31. Except in the case of prime movers.
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position or of such construction as to be as safe32 to every per-
son employed or working on the premises as it would be if se-
curely fenced.3 3 In determining whether any part of machinery
is in such a position or of such construction as to be as safe as
it would be if securely fenced no account must be taken of ex-
aminations of part of the machinery while it is in motion or of
any lubrication or adjustment shown to be immediately neces-
sary and which can be carried out only while the machine is in
motion. No account must be taken either of lubrication or
mounting or shipping of belts undertaken in respect of ma-
chinery used in certain processes specified in ministerial reg-
ulations3 4 as requiring these operations to be undertaken while
the machinery is in motion. These lubrications, adjustments,
etc., may, however, be undertaken only by male persons over the
age of eighteen. 35
The machinery referred to above must be securely fenced
and the act does not circumscribe the duty by reference to prac-
ticability or reasonability. Thus, if a piece of machinery can-
not be securely guarded and still retain its commercial useful-
ness, then a factory occupier who uses this equipment (by defi-
nition, not securely guarded) will be absolutely responsible for
any injury that may result to an operative.3 6
While all flywheels, prime movers, electric generators, and
transmission machinery must be securely guarded (unless safe
by position or by construction), other machinery need be guard-
ed only insofar as it is "dangerous." Whether or not a part of
machinery is dangerous depends ultimately on whether injury
was foreseeable. In the recent case of Close v. Steel Co. of
Wales, Ltd.3 7 Lord Guest defined this term as follows: "I take
32. In Hodkinson v. 1-1. Wallwork, Ltd., [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 1195, trans-
mission machinery nine feet above the ground was held not to be in such a posi-
tion as to be as safe as if it were fenced. Similarly, the fact that a piece of
machinery is accessible only if a ladder is used does not bring it within the
scope of the exception clause. Butler v. Glacier Metal Co., [1924] unreported.
It has been suggested that in deciding whether or not a piece of machinery is by
position or by construction as safe as if it were securely fenced the test of fore-
seeability has to be used in the same way as in determining the dangerous nature
of a piece of machinery. Cf. REDGRAVE, FACTORIES ACTS 39 (20th ed., Fife and
Machin, 1962).
33. Samuels suggests that this exception will only free the occupier from a
criminal prosecution without affecting, however, his civil liability. SAMUELS,
FACTORY LAW 58 (6th ed. 1957).
34. The Operations at Unfenced Machinery Regulations, 1938. S.R. & 0.
1938, No. 641.
35. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 15.
36. John Summers & Sons Ltd. v. Frost, [1955] A.C. 740.
37. [1961] 3 Weekly L.R. 319.
[Vol. XXIV
BRITISH FACTORY LAW
the test whether a part of a machine is dangerous from the dic-
tum of du Parcq, J., in Walker v. Bletchley Flettons, Ltd.38 as
qualified by Lord Reid in John Summers & Sons, Ltd. v. Frost89
whether it might be "'a reasonably foreseeable cause of injury
to anybody acting in a way in which a human being may be rea-
sonably expected to act in circumstances which may be reason-
ably expected to occur.' "
The fact that an accident has taken place which could have
been prevented by a guard on the machine does not necessarily
prove that the machine is dangerous and should have been
guarded, 40 though it may be difficult to disprove the presump-
tion of its dangerous propensity for the future. The court will
have to consider whether the injury was foreseeable and, in
doing so, the judge will consider possible dangers to an average
worker, one perhaps not too safety-conscious, but nevertheless
not inclined to reckless behavior. What one need not provide
for is some completely reckless act on part of a worker.41
Once it has been proved that a part of a machine is danger-
ous it becomes the occupier's duty to insure that the machine is
securely fenced. The courts have used the same test (i.e., that
of foreseeability) in deciding whether a guard is secure as that
employed by them in determining whether a part of machinery
is dangerous. 42 Fencing is secure only if it effectively removes
the danger against which the guard has been provided. No
guard is, of course, absolutely secure in the presence of a reck-
less worker unwilling to heed obvious danger. Law will there-
fore consider the guard to be secure if, in all foreseeable cir-
cumstances, it will protect workers against the risks which are
foreseeable when using this part of machinery. We reach there-
fore once more the conclusion that proof of injury to a work-
man is not conclusive evidence that a dangerous part of machin-
ery has not been securely fenced. Not only may the court hold
that the part in question was not "dangerous" and thus did not
require fencing because injury was not foreseeable, but even
where injury was foreseeable an action by an injured worker
38. [1937] 1 All E.R. 170.
39. [1955] A.C. 740.
40. Hindle v. Birtwistle, [1897] 1 Q.B. 192, 195.
41. Carr v. Mercantile Producer Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 601. If the worker's
foolish act is reasonably foreseeable, it should be guarded against. Cf. Smith v.
Chesterfield & District Co-operative Society, Ltd. [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 370.
42. Burns v. Joseph Terry & Sons, Ltd., (1951] 1 K.B. 454. For a critical
examination of this case see Munkman, Foreseeability and the Factories Act,
102 L.J. 549 (1952).
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may yet fail if the court is satisfied that it was not foreseeable
for anyone to get hurt with the existing guard in position.
The next point to consider is against what kind of hazard
the worker is to be protected. Post-war case law on this issue
has passed through three stages. The earliest attitude was that
"the purpose of a guard is to keep the worker out and not that
of keeping the machine or its products in."' 43 This meant that a
guard had to be so designed that it prevented direct physical
contact between the body of the operator and the dangerous
part of the machine, but that the guard need not be designed so
as to prevent parts of the machine or of materials used in the
machine from flying out and hitting the operator. In the early
'fifties in a number of decisions the Court of Appeal altered its
approach and held that to be secure a guard had to protect the
worker against all foreseeable risks of injury; and if it was
foreseeable that parts of the machine might break and strike
the operator, then the guard had to be so designed as to prevent
this from happening.44 In two cases, decided quite recently, 45
the House of Lords has overruled the Court of Appeal and has
restored the earlier position. Their Lordships were by no means
happy46 about the implications of their decision which was
based largely on section 14(2) of the act which provides:
"In so far as the safety of a dangerous part of any machin-
ery cannot by reason of the operation be secured by means
of a fixed guard, the requirements of sub-section (1) of this
section shall be deemed to have been complied with if a
device is provided which automatically prevents the operator
from coming into contact with that part."
This is a harmless enough sounding provision aimed clearly
at permitting the use of automatic guards where this is a more
satisfactory safety device than the use of fixed guards. The
reader will notice, however, that the automatic guards are said
43. Lord Simonds in Nicholls v. Austin (F) (Leyton) Ltd., [1946] A.C.
493.
44. "If it is known-or might reasonably be anticipated- that parts of the
machine might fly out or break off and do injury, then those parts are dangerous
and must be fenced." Per Denning, L.J., in Hewnham v. Taggert, Morgan &
Coles, Ltd. (1956) unreported. See also Dickson v. Flack, [1953] 2 Q.B. 464.
45. Close v. Steel Co. of Wales, Ltd., [1961] 3 Weekly L.R. 319; Sparrow
v. Fairey Aviation Co., [1962] 3 Weekly L.R. 1210.
46. "The argument has shown how technical and artificial the question of
protection under section 14 has become and how illusory in certain respects the
words 'Every dangerous part of any machinery . . . shall be securely fenced.'
have now become." Per Holroyd Pearce, L.J., in Eaves v. Morris Motors, Ltd.,
[1961] 3 Weekly L.R. 657, 664.
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to satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) if they prevent the
operator from coming into contact with the dangerous part of
the machinery. Since section 14 cannot be interpreted disjunc-
tively, the House of Lords drew the conclusion that the general
requirements of the section are fulfilled if a guard is provided
which prevents direct contact between worker and machine, i.e.,
which keeps out the worker, even if it does not keep in the
machine.
In respect of the danger from flying parts of material, the
House of Lords in their decisions relied on section 14 (6) of the
act which authorizes the Minister of Labour to make regulations
requiring the fencing of materials or articles which are danger-
ous while in motion in the machine. It was argued that if the
general duty to fence embraced also this type of situation there
would have been no need to provide for it separately by regula-
tions.
It should be noted in passing that while an employee injured
by a part of machinery or by particles of material which have
flown out and hit him has no redress at present under the Fac-
tories Act, he may well be able to claim damages for common
law negligence if the injury was one which his employer should
have anticipated and therefore should have guarded against.47
Clearly the present position as to the occupier's duty to fence
is a most unsatisfactory one. The duty, as interpreted by the
courts, is narrower than what Parliament must have intended
when enacting it. This limited interpretation has led to further
inconsistencies. In a recent case48 it was held that where the
potentially dangerous part of a machine was inaccessible to the
operator so that his body could not come into contact with it,
there was no duty to guard that part, notwithstanding that an
employee could suffer injury through a tool held by him coming
into contact with the dangerous part of the machine. It was
strenuously argued on behalf of the plaintiff that a hand-tool
was an extension of the operator's body and comparisons were
drawn with the case where some part of the operator's clothing
might come into contact with the piece of machinery; but, while
at least one learned judge believed that a part of machinery
should be treated as dangerous if there existed a possibility that
47. Lord Goddard in Close v. Steel Co. of Wales, [1961] 3 Weekly L.R.
319, 331.
48. Sparrow v. Fairey Aviation Co., [1961] 3 Weekly L.R. 855.
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it might come into contact with the worker's clothing,49 the
court was not prepared to extend this situation to where a tool
was concerned.
The machinery which has to be securely guarded includes
only those machines which form part of the factory's equipment;
it does not include machinery produced in the factory for sale. 50
Thus, an electric fan used in a factory will clearly have to be
securely guarded while it is being tested, but not a similar fan
which has been made in the factory and which is being tested
before shipment. As before, however, the employer's common
law duty to provide a reasonably safe system of work will ex-
tend to such a situation.
It has been pointed out already that where it is impossible
to guard securely a dangerous part of machinery without mak-
ing the machine practically useless the machine cannot be used
without the occupier committing a breach of the act.51 The Min-
ister of Labour may, however, make regulations modifying or
extending any of the safety provisions of the act.5 2 Regulations
of this kind may be made in respect of all factories or in re-
spect of any one specified class or description of factories. Some
of the regulations 3 made under this section specify the type of
guard to be provided for particular dangerous parts of machin-
ery and where such a guard has been provided, the factory oc-
cupier has satisfied the requirements of the act, even if this
guard does not securely guard the dangerous part.54 The Min-
ister is thus in effect enabled to create exceptions to the abso-
lute nature of the duty to guard. The regulations apply only in
49. Sellers, L.J., In the House of Lords Debate on § 14(2) of the act, Vis-
count Hailsham shows surprise that anyone could doubt that clothes count as
part of the person for the purpose of this section. 248 II.L. Rep. 73, col. 1350
(25th April 1963).
50. Parvin v. Morton Machine Co., Ltd., [1952] A.C. 515.
51. Davies v. Thomas Owen & Co., [1919] 2 K.B. 39 (a calendering ma-
chine); Sowter v. Steel Barrel Co., [1935) 154 L.T. 85 (a power press);
Dennistoun v. Charles E. Greenhill, Ltd., [1944] 2 All E.R. 434 (a cutting
machine) ; Mackay v. Ailsa Shipbuilding Co., [1945] S.C. 414 (a drilling ma-
chine) ; John Summers & Son, Ltd. v. Frost, [1955] A.C. 760 (a grinding wheel) ;
Pugh v. Manchester Dry Docks Co., [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 389 (grinding ma-
chine).
52. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 76.
53. E.g., Woodworking Machinery Regulations, 1922 S.R. & 0. 1922 No. 1196
Horizontal Milling Machines Regulations, 1928. S.R. & 0. 1928 No. 548. These
and many similar regulations were made under § 60 of the Factories Act, 1937,
and are now continued in force by virtue of § 183 and the Sixth Schedule to
the 1961 act.
54. Miller v. William Boothman & Sons, Ltd., [1944] 1 K.B. 337; Franklin
v. Gramophone Co., [1948] 1 K.B. 542.
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respect of the dangerous parts enumerated in them; other dan-
gerous parts of the same machinery will have to be guarded in
accordance with the general provisions of the act.55
All guards provided in pursuance of the safety provisions of
the act must be of substantial construction and must be con-
stantly maintained 6 and kept in position while the parts requir-
ing to be guarded are in motion or in use, except where the
parts are necessarily exposed for examination and for any lubri-
cation or adjustment shown by the examination to be imme-
diately necessary.57 "In motion or in use" means in motion or
in use for the purposes for which the machine is intended58 and
does not refer to a situation where the parts are in motion for
repair purposes or where they are being moved by hand.59
Any person who sells or lets on hire for use in a factory in
the United Kingdom any machine intended to be driven by
mechanical power which does not contain the guards detailed in
section 17(1) is guilty of an offense and liable to a fine not ex-
ceeding £200.60 Such a seller of machinery will, however, not
be liable as a joint tortfeasor with the occupier of the factory
to a worker who has suffered an injury because of the absence
of the appropriate guard."'
Hoists or lifts used in a factory must be of good mechanical
construction, sound material and adequate strength, and be
properly maintained.62  The last mentioned phrase implies that
they must be kept in a continuing state of working efficiency.5
Hoists and lifts must be thoroughly examined by a competent
person at least once every six months and a report on the exam-
55. Benn v. Kamm & Co., [1952] 2 Q.B. 127; Automatic Woodturning Co. v.
Stringer, [1957] A.C. 544.
56. "Maintained" means maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working
order, and in good repair. (§ 176) This includes supervision to insure that opera-
tives properly adjust the guards provided. Cakebread v. I-loppings Brothers
(Whetstone) Ltd., [1947] K.B. 641.
57. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 16.
58. Richard Thomas & Baldwin Ltd. v. Cummings, [1955] A.C. 321.
59. Knight v. Leamington Spa Courier Ltd., [1961] 3 Weekly L.R. 79.
60. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 17(2).
61. Biddle v. Truvox Engineering Co., [1952] 1 K.B. 101. There exists, how-
ever, a general common law duty for manufacturers of equipment, where the
equipment is unlikely to be examined before being used, to exercise due care so
that the equipment should be safe for those likely to use it. Cf. Haseldine v.
Daw & Son Ltd., [1941] 2 K.B. 343; Mason v. Williams & Williams Ltd. and
Thomas Turton & Sons, Ltd., [1955] 1 All E.R. 808. See also MUNKMAN,
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW 129 et seq. (4th ed. 1959).
62. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 22.
63. Galashiels Gas Co. v. Millar, [1949] A.C. 275.
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ination must be entered in the general register kept in the fac-
tory. 4 Where it is found that the hoist or lift cannot be safely
used without certain repairs being undertaken, the person mak-
ing the examination must within twenty-eight days send a copy
of his report to the district inspector of factories. 65 Every hoist-
way or liftway shall be efficiently protected by a substantial
enclosure fitted with gates and this enclosure must be so con-
structed as to prevent, when the gates are shut, any person from
falling down the liftway or from coming into contact with any
moving part of the lift or hoist.66 The act contains further safe-
ty rules applying specifically to hoists and lifts used for carry-
ing persons.6 T
All floors, steps, stairs, passages, and gangways shall be of
sound construction and properly maintained and shall, so far as
is reasonably practicable, be kept free from any obstruction and
from any substance likely to cause persons to slip.68 The refer-
ence to "sound construction" is to be interpreted as dealing with
the structure of the surface of the floor 69 and in deciding
whether a floor complies with the requirements of the act, due
notice must be taken of the purpose which the premises are in-
tended to serve.7° "Properly maintained" is related to "sound
construction" and means that the floor must not only be solidly
constructed but must be maintained in this condition. The re-
quirement that floors, etc., must be kept free from obstructions
and free from slippery substances was introduced by the 1959
act mainly because the earlier phrasing of this section implied
that a slippery floor did not constitute a breach of the act since
it was not necessarily of unsound construction.7 1 The occupier's
duty is restricted by the inclusion of the phrase "so far as is
reasonably practicable." This phrase has introduced the prin-
ciple of a balance of risk inasmuch as the court has to compare
the likelihood of an employee suffering injury and the likely
gravity of such an injury with the cost and inconvenience of
taking effective steps to prevent the floor from being slippery.72
64. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 22(2).
65. Id. § 22(3).
66. Id. § 22 (4).
67. Id. § 23.
68. Id. § 28.
69. Latimer v. A.E.C. Ltd., [1953] A.C. 643.
70. Payne v. Weldless Steel Tube Co., [1956] 1 Q.B. 196; Mayne v. John-
stone & Cumbers Ltd., [1947] 2 All E.R. 159.
71. Latimer v. A.E.C. Ltd., [1953] A.C. 643.
72. E.g., Braham v. J. Lyons & Co., [1962] 1 Weekly L.R. 1048, held that this
section did not imply that a floor must be kept absolutely free at all times from
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The position under the act does not differ significantly from
the position at common law where the employer is already under
an obligation to take all reasonable steps to protect his em-
ployees from injury. This was interpreted in Latimer v. A.E.C.
Ltd. as justifying the taking of some risks where the cost of
making the floor absolutely safe would have been the loss of a
night's work and pay by all the workers on the night shift.
Staircases must be provided with substantial handrails78 and
openings in floors must be securely fenced except where the na-
ture of the work renders this impracticable.7 4 All ladders must
be soundly constructed and properly maintained.7 5 It should be
noted that these obligations, unlike those referred to in the pre-
ceding paragraph, are absolute ones, and the occupier of the
factory will not escape liability if he has taken all practicable
steps without, however, achieving the result postulated in that
section.7
6
There shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be provided
and maintained safe means of access to every place at which
any person has at any time to work and every such place shall,
so far as is reasonably practicable, be made and kept safe for
any person working there.77 This section of the act deals in
general terms with means of access, while the preceding section
dealt with specific means of access, e.g., gangways and stair-
cases. We have noted already that in the section dealing with
specific means of access the employer's duty was an absolute
one, while the present section calls upon him to do what is rea-
sonably practicable.7 8 Prior to 1959 much learning was spent
on distinguishing between the means of access to a place where
a person has to work and the place of work itself,79 since the
occupier's duty to provide safe conditions applied to the means
of access only. Since 1959 both the means of access and the
place of work have to be safe. It should be further observed
that the occupier's obligation exists in respect of "any person"
who has to work somewhere within the factory and embraces
slippery substances but that merely all reasonable measures must be taken to
keep it free.
73. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 28(2).
74. Id. § 28(4).
75. Id. § 28(5).
76. Cole v. Blackstone & Co., [1943] K.B. 615.
77. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 29(1).
78. McCarthy v. Coldair Ltd., [1951] 2 T.L.R. 1226.
79. For a useful summary of the pre-1959 law see Keating, Safe Means of
Access, 7 INDusTRIAL L. REV. 272 (1953).
1964]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
thus not only the occupier's own employees but also independent
contractors and their servants. s0
The duty under section 29 is not an absolute one and the
occupier may show by way of defense that it was not reasonably
practicable for him to provide safe means of access. 8' What is
or is not reasonably practicable depends ultimately again on a
comparison of the degree of risk incurred if nothing is done
with the cost or inconvenience of countering it. Some difficulty
has arisen in interpreting "providing and maintaining" a safe
access, especially as to whether this implies a continuing duty. 2
The occupier is expected to use a system which will insure that
the safety of the means of access is maintained, but it is not
reasonably practicable to expect of him arrangements which
will effectively guarantee the safety of the means of access at
any one point of time. It is now generally agreed that where
the means of access have become temporarily unsafe because of
the presence of some transient obstruction, 3 no breach of the
occupier's duty has taken place. The degree of safety of the
means of access depends on the principle of foreseeability;
means of access are safe if they are secure in all foreseeable con-
tingencies, but lack of safety in an unforeseeable contingency
will not constitute a breach of duty.
Finally, it should be noted that a means of access need be
safe only if it provides access to a place of work.8 4 Thus, where
it provides access to a works canteen, for instance, the section
would not apply, though an employee injured in such a place
may have redress at common law.
Where any person has to work at a place from which he is
liable to fall a distance of more than six feet six inches, then,
unless the place is one which affords secure foothold and, where
necessary, secure handhold, means shall be provided so far as is
reasonably practicable, by fencing or otherwise, for insuring his
safety."5 In Wigley v. British Vinegars, Ltd.86 the IHouse of
Lords held that a soundly constructed ladder provided both se-
cure foothold and handhold for an experienced window-cleaner
80. Lavender v. Diamints Ltd., [1949] 1 K.B. 585.
81. McCarthy v. Coldair Ltd., [1951] 2 T.L.R. 1226.
82. Callaghan v. Fred Kidd Ltd., [1944] K.B. 560.
83. Levesley v. Thomas Firth and John Brown Ltd., [1953] 1 Weekly L.R.
1206.
84. Davies v. De Havilland Ltd., [1951] 1 K.B. 50.
85. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 29(2).
86. [1962] 3 Weekly L.R. 731. See also Note, 78 L.Q. REV. 463 (1962).
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even though he, because of the nature of his work, was unable
to use the handhold.
The act contains further general safety provisions in respect
of explosive or inflammable dust and gas,8 7 steam boilers 8 and
steam and air receivers, 9 and means of fire escape.90
SPECIAL SAFETY PROVISIONS
Part IV of the act deals with Health, Safety and Welfare
(Special Provisions and Regulations). Mention will be made
here of the provisions concerning the removal of dust or fumes
and those concerning the protection of eyes in certain processes.
In every factory in which in connection with any process
carried on there is given off any dust or fume or other impurity
of such a character or to such an extent as to be likely to be in-
jurious or offensive to the persons employed or any substantial
quantity of dust of any kind, all practicable measures shall be
taken to protect the persons employed against inhalation of the
dust, fume or other impurity and to prevent it accumulating in
any workroom.91
The occupier must take steps to remove dust, etc., in two
cases, namely (1) where the dust is dangerous or offensive or
(2) where a substantial quantity of any dust, even though harm-
less by itself, is generated. As far as the first leg of the section
is concerned, the occupier's duty to remove the dust arises only
where he knows or should have known of its dangerous or of-
fensive propensity. The dust must be dangerous in general and
the fact that it happens to be dangerous to a particular em-
ployee who suffers from some allergy to it is not enough.9 2 In
determining whether dust or fumes are offensive some regard
has to be paid to the special conditions of the industry, meaning
that people employed in a particular industry may have to put
up with fumes which would clearly be treated as offensive in
other industries.9 3 The second leg of the section deals with the
situation where to the knowledge of the occupier a substantial
87. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, §31.
88. Id. § § 32-34.
89. Id. §§ 35-38.
90. Id. § 40 et seq.
91. Id. § 63.
92. Ebbs v. James Whitson & Co., [1952] 2 Q.B. 877.
93. Coote v. Eastern Gas Board, [19531 1 Q.B. 594.
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quantity of dust is given off in the process 94 and does not cover
the situation where the quantity of dust generated is a small one
but the occupier has allowed the dust to accumulate.95
The occupier in these cases has a duty to take all "practica-
ble measures" to protect the persons employed against the in-
halation of the dust. What is "practicable" depends on the state
of knowledge at that point of time6 and an occupier who pro-
vides masks which are considered to be adequate for the pur-
pose will not become liable if it is later discovered that these
masks do not provide adequate protection 97 but that a different
type of mask, previously unknown, would have done so.
Section 65 empowers the Minister of Labour to prescribe by'
regulations9" certain factory processes which involve a special
risk of injury to the eyes from particles or fragments thrown
off in the course of the process. Occupiers employing workers
on any of these prescribed processes must provide suitable gog-
gles or effective screens to protect the eyes of the persons work-
ing on these processes.
The courts have had occasion to consider what is meant by
"providing" goggles. It has been held that it is not enough to
have goggles available on the premises, e.g., hanging in the fore-
man's office, but that they must be placed somewhere where
they are easily accessible when wanted or that clear instructions
are issued to the workman as to where they are kept. 9
The "suitability" of the goggles provided depends on the
process in which they will be needed but it has been held that
the addition after "goggles" of the words "to protect the eyes
of the persons employed" does not mean that the occupier's
duty is an absolute one but merely represents a descriptive
statement in respect of the goggles. 10°
The duty to provide goggles exists only vis-h-vis the occu-
pier's own employees and the employees of independent con-
tractors who happen to be working in the factory cannot hold
94. Richards v. Highway Ironfounders, Ltd., [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 1049.
95. Nash v. Parkinson Cowan Ltd., [1961] 105 S.J. 323.
96. Adsett v. K. & L. Steelfounders, Ltd., [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 773.
97. "Practicable measures" include, however, the taking of steps to induce
workmen to wear the masks provided for them.. Crookall v. Vickers-Armstrong,
Ltd., [19551 1 Weekly L.R. 659.
98. Cf. Protection of Eyes Regulations, 1938. S.R. & 0. 1938 No. 654.
99. Finch v. Telegraph Construction Co., [1949] 1 All E.R. 552.
100. Daniels v. Ford Motor Co., [1955) 1 Weekly L.R. 76.
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the occupier liable if their own employer has failed to provide
goggles.101
THE NATURE OF THE OCCUPIER'S LIABILITY
The various duties regarding safety in a factory are placed
by the act on the "occupier" who may, but need not, be the
owner of the factory. The act contains no definition of an occu-
pier, but we may follow Lord MacLaren 10 2 who said: "Occupier
plainly means the person who runs the factory, regulates and
controls the work that is done there." It is quite possible for
different parts of the same factory building to be "occupied" by
different persons who would then have to accept responsibility
for the observance of the safety provisions in their part of the
building.
An action brought by an injured workman who claims that
his injury was caused by the employer's failure to carry out the
safety provisions of the act is basically an action for negligence
where, however, the standard of care which the defendant is
alleged to have failed to observe is not the common law standard
but that specifically laid down by the act. It is therefore par-
ticularly important to examine carefully the terminology of the
act. This has to be interpreted in the light of the general pur-
pose of the act,1 °" which is that of preventing accidents to work-
men. It is true, of course, that an occupier who acts in breach
of any of the provisions of the act commits an offense for which
he may be prosecuted by the inspector of factories irrespective
of whether an injured worker will also bring a civil action for
damages. Indeed, a breach of the provisions of the act consti-
tutes an offense even if no one is injured. It has been argued
that since a breach of one of the provisions of the act consti-
tutes an offense, in the event of doubt as to the meaning of a
particular phrase that sense should be chosen which would
avoid criminal liability 1 4 and since such a phrase would have
to be given the same meaning in criminal and in civil proceed-
ings, the same principle should also apply in a civil action. This
method of interpretation might however clash with the gen-
eral purpose of the act, i.e., to protect workmen, and the courts
101. Whalley v. Briggs Motor Bodies, Ltd., [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 840.
102. In Ramsay v. Mackie, [1904] 7 F. 106, 109, approved by the Court of
Appeal in Cox v. S. Cutler & Sons, [1948] 2 All E.R. 665.
103. Cf. Wrottesley, The Nature of Responsibility Under the Factories Acts,
7 INDUSTRIAL L. REV. 101 (1952).
104. Sumner v. Priestley, [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 1202.
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have therefore preferred to apply the normal principles of in-
terpretation appropriate to penal statutes only where all other
rules of interpretation have failed.10 5
The meaning attached by the courts to "dangerous" parts
and to "secure" fencing and "safe" means of access have been
discussed already. The occupier is instructed by some sec-
tions 10 6 of the act to take such measures as are "practicable."
This means that he is called upon to do what is feasible and he
is not expected to take precautions against dangers which are
not commonly known,'1 7 or to use safety devices which at that
time have not yet been invented. "Taking practicable measures"
includes, however, a duty to supervise and enforce the use of
the appliances provided. Where the act asks that certain things
be done if this is "reasonably practicable,"''0 8 the standard of
care that is thrust upon the occupier is less stringent than
where there is no reference to reasonableness. To do what is
"reasonably practicable" means doing what in the circumstances
appears necessary or, alternatively, what a reasonable employer
would consider desirable in the situation.0 9 Certain steps which
are practicable in the sense that there do not exist any technical
difficulties in implementing them, may not be reasonably prac-
ticable in that a reasonable occupier would consider the risk of
injury too remote to warrant the installation of some expensive
or complicated safety devices. 10 We have shown already that
this standard of care is similar to that imposed on an employer
at common law.
Hoists and lifts must be of "sound construction" and the
same criterion is also applied in respect of passages, etc. Earlier
decisions argued that something could not be soundly construct-
ed in a functional vacuum, inasmuch as soundness of construc-
tion always relates to the purpose which the thing is intended
to serve."' Later decisions have followed a different line of ap-
proach and the position today appears to be that "sound con-
struction" is a synonym for "well made" so that something (e.g.,
lifting tackle) may be of sound construction although totally
105. Norris v. Syndic Ltd., [1952] 2 Q.B. 135; McCarthy v. Coldair Ltd.,
11951] 2 T.L.R. 1226.
106. E.g., §§28(4), 30(8), 31(1) (2) (4) (5), 32(2).
107. Cf. Adsett v. K. & L. Steelfounders, Ltd., [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 773.
108. E.g., 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, §§ 22, 23, 28(1), 29(1) (2).
109. Marshall v. Gotham Co., [1954] A.C. 360.
110. Edwards v. National Coal Board, [1949] 1 K.B. 704.
111. Mayne v. Johnstone & Cumbers, Ltd., [1947] 2 All E.R. 159.
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unsuitable for the purpose to which it is being applied. 1 12 Sim-
ilarly, where the act imposes a duty that something shall be
"properly maintained," this relates only to the general physical
condition (e.g., of floor boards in a passage) and does not call
for the removal of obstacles that may accumulate on the sur-
face." 3
The House of Lords have recently 1 4 drawn attention to the
ambiguity of the phrase "properly maintain" which may either
imply an absolute duty to keep something in a proper and effi-
cient state or may merely impose an obligation of servicing the
thing in question. Of these two possible interpretations their
Lordships preferred the former one.
BURDEN OF PROOF
In an action for breach of statutory duty as in any other
action for negligence the plaintiff has to prove not only that
there existed a duty and that it has been broken but also that
there exists a definite causal link between the breach of that
duty and the injury which he has sustained. It is not of course
necessary to show that the breach of duty was the sole cause of
the injury, but it must at least have materially contributed to-
wards it." 5 This point is particularly important where the plain-
tiff has suffered injury which he would have avoided if the
occupier had provided the safety appliance demanded by the
act. It is not enough for the plaintiff to prove his injury and
the absence of the safety device; he must also satisfy the court
that he would have used the device if it had been provided."0
Where the plaintiff has made it clear in the past that he would
not use the particular type of device (e.g., goggles or a safety
belt), he cannot subsequently claim that his injury was caused
by the absence of the device." 7
Proof of a causal link between the absence of a safety device
and the plaintiff's injury is, of course, always difficult and the
court will not insist on direct evidence, such as an outright re-
fusal by the occupier of a request by the plaintiff to be pro-
112. Gledhill v. Liverpool Abbatoir Utility Co., [1957] 1 Weekly L.R. 1028.
113. Latimer v. A.E.C., Ltd. [1953] A.C. 643.
114. Hamilton v. National Coal Board, [1960] 2 Weekly L.R. 313. See also
Note, 76 L.Q. REV. 338 (1960).
115. Bonnington Castings Ltd. v. Wardlaw, [1956] A.C. 613.
116. McWilliams v. Sir William Arroll & Co., [1961] Scots. L.T. 265.
117. Nolan v. Dental Manufacturing Co., [1958] 1 Weekly L.R. 936; Wigley
v. British Vinegars Ltd., [1962] 3 Weekly L.R. 731.,
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vided with a particular type of device. In some cases the court
will be satisfied with proof by inference" 8 or with proof based
on balance of probability.119 This is perhaps particularly impor-
tant where a worker has contracted a disease, the effects of
which become noticeable only some years later, by which time
he may have changed his employment. The court will then have
to be satisfied that the absence of safety devices (e.g., exhausts
to remove dangerous dust) in the plaintiff's earlier employment
has materially contributed120 to the disease from which he is
now suffering.
While clearly a breach of one of the safety provisions of the
act will entitle an injured worker to claim damages,' 21 it is open
to doubt whether a similar cause of action will accrue where
one of the welfare provisions of the act has been broken. This
depends on whether, in the opinion of the court, the particular
provision was intended to grant a right of action to a class of
persons to whom the plaintiff belongs. This question was dis-
cussed at length, though not with particular reference to the
Factories Acts, in Solomons v. R. Gertzenstein, Ltd. 22 Somer-
vell, L.J., quoted with approval a statement made by Atkin, L.J.,
in Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry Ltd. :123 "Therefore,
the question is whether these regulations, viewed in the circum-
stances in which they were made and to which they relate, were
intended to impose a duty which is a public duty only or wheth-
er they were intended, in addition to the public duty, to impose
a duty enforceable by an individual aggrieved." Somervell, L.J.,
concluded that theref did not exist a rule of thumb formula that
could be applied but that it was necessary in each case to con-
sider the act. Where the act provides remedies of its own for
a breach of certain of its provisions (e.g., fines), the question
is whether these remedies exclude the possibility of a civil action
by the injured party. This has to be answered by reference to
118. "[Wlhere you find there has been a breach of one of these safety regula-
tions and where you find that the accident complained of is the very class of
accident that the regulations are designed to prevent, a court should certainly
not be astute to find that the breach of the regulations was not connected with
the accident, was not the cause of the accident." Lord Goddard, C.J., in Lee v.
Nursery Furnishing Ltd., [1945] 1 All E.R. 387, 390 (C.A.).
119. Nicholson v. Atlas Steel Foundry & Engineering Co., [1957] 1 Weekly
L.R. 613 (H.L.).
120. Gardiner v. Motherwell Machinery & Scrap Co., [1961] 1 Weekly L.R.
1424 (H.L.).
121. Groves v. Wimborne (Lord), [1898] 2 Q.B. 402.
122. [1954] 3 Weekly L.R. 317.
123. [1923] 2 K.B. 832, 842.
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the overriding purpose of the act. Where the act provides no
specific sanctions for the breach of its provisions, the plaintiff's
position would appear to be an even stronger one.
Applying this reasoning to the problem before us we find
that the courts have in many cases allowed a cause of action to
a plaintiff who claimed that he had suffered injuries because of
a breach by the defendant of one of the health or welfare pro-
visions of the Factories Act.1 24 This is so, notwithstanding the
fact that sections 8 and 9 contain specific provisions regarding
the enforcement of Part I of the act dealing with health.
Not all health and welfare provisions will of course be dealt
with in the same manner. "Welfare" may at times include ele-
ments of safety, while other welfare provisions appear to have
no direct relevance to safety issues. It is necessary therefore to
consider each section independently and on its merits to deter-
mine whether it is primarily intended to secure safety or wel-
fare. 1 25 This is particularly important where the effects of the
particular section have not yet been judicially considered.
THE OccupIER's DEFENSES
The occupier is unable to employ the defense of volenti non
fit injuria since the very purpose of the act is to protect work-
men against foreseeable risks. Of course, the worker himself
must also consider his own safety and, if he were to act in open
disregard of his own safety, the employer may plead contribu-
tory negligence. If it is then proved that while the employer
has failed in his duties under the act, the plaintiff has also
failed in his duty to look after his own safety, the court will
apportion the loss suffered by the plaintiff between him and the
defendant in proportion to their respective degrees of negli-
gence.126 It is feasible that the employer's breach of duty may
124. Carroll v. North British Locomotive Co., [1957] Scots. L.T. 2 (clean-
liness) ; Clarkson v. Modern Foundries Ltd., [1957] 1 Weekly L.R. 1210 (venti-
lation) McCarthy v. Daily Mirror Ltd. [1949] 1 All E.R. 841 (Ch.) (accommo-
dation for clothing) ; Murray v. Walnut Cabinet Works Ltd., [1955] 105 L.J. 41;
Nicholson v. Atlas Steel Foundry Ltd., [1957] 1 Weekly L.R. 613 (temperature,
ventilation) ; Reid v. Westfield Paper Co., [1957] S.C. 218 (washing facilities).
125. E.g., 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 60 (sitting facilities). "Some of the welfare
provisions such as section 44 (under the 1947 Act) which deals with facilities
for sitting, seem to have purely welfare outlook; others, such as section 45
(1937 Act) which deals with first aid, seem to impinge substantially on matters
of health and safety." Clyde, L.P., in Reid v. Westfield Paper Co., [1957] S.C.
218, 225.
126. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 28.
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be treated as a mere nominal breach so that the plaintiff's share
in the damage could be assessed at 100%.
The occupier's duties under the act are personal ones and he
'cannot discharge these duties by delegating them to another
person.127 If he delegates his duties - however competent the
person may be to whom delegation has taken place - the occu-
.pier will remain liable if the duty has not been carried out.128
It is sometimes contended that delegation is a defense where
the duty has been delegated to the plaintiff himself.129 In point
of fact, even in these circumstances there will be no valid de-
fense of delegation but the occupier can clearly plead contribu-
tory negligence. Whether or not this plea will succeed will de-
pend on the reasonableness of the occupier's action. If the plain-
tiff is a foreman or a skilled and experienced worker to whom
it is reasonable to entrust the performance of these duties, the
employer will succeed, but not if the plaintiff is a person lack-
ing the necessary experience for the task entrusted to him (e.g.,
the fitting of a guard to a dangerous part of a machine).
CONCLUSIONS
Writing some four years ago, Professor 0. Kahn-Freund
committed himself to the following statement:180 "Today there
can hardly be any country in which the civil liability of the em-
ployer for factory accidents - and normally this means the lia-
bility of the insurance company - goes as far as it does here."
While this may well be true of the overall position, i.e., taking
together the remedies at common law and under the Factories
Act, it is not true if the Factories Act is considered by itself.
The judges in applying the provisions of the act are bound by
the text of the act and by the interpretation given to it by their
predecessors. A series of recent decisions, most of which have
been referred to already in this paper, shows clearly that what
one must assume to have been the intention of the legislature in
devising the occupier's duty under section 14 of the act has been
seriously whittled down by the courts.
127. "But in truth the employer's obligation . . . is personal to the employer
and one to be performed by the employer per se or per alios." Lord Wright, in
Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co. v. English, [1938] A.C. 57, 80.
128. Of. Jackson, The Delegation by Employers of Their Statutory Duties, 8
INDUSTRIAL L. REV. 181 (1953).
129. Mulready v. Bell, [1953] 2 Q.B. 117.




In order that the occupier be liable for an injury suffered
.by a workman it is necessary for the workman to prove (a)
that there existed a dangerous part of machinery, (b) that this
part was not securely fenced and (c) that the injury resulted
directly from the absence of a guard. We have shown already
that the test of foreseeability is employed in determining wheth-
er a part is dangerous. If "in the ordinary course of human af-
fairs danger could not reasonably be anticipated from the use
(of the part) unfenced"'' the part is not to be treated as dan-
gerous and the occupier will not be liable if the plaintiff has
sustained injury.
It would appear logical to proceed from this point and to
argue that once it has been shown that a part of machinery is
dangerous "the statutory obligation to see that it is securely
fenced means that it must be so fenced as to give security from
such dangers as may reasonably be expected in the working of
the machine."'1 8 2 Thus, if the danger involved is that of parts
of the machine flying out, the guard should be such as to pre-
vent these particles from hitting and injuring the workman.
The two considerations which have induced the courts to adopt
a more restrictive interpretation have been discussed already.
The interpretation which the courts have attached to section
14(2) of the act clearly leads to the conclusion that the danger
against which the fence is intended to guard the operator is
merely that of direct contact with the dangerous part of the
machine.8 3
Similarly, section 14(6), which authorizes the Minister to
make regulations in respect of any machine or process "requir-
ing the fencing of materials or articles which are dangerous
while in motion in the machine" has been understood as mean-
ing that in the normal course of events, i.e., in the absence of
specific regulations, materials in the machine need not be
guarded.13
4
131. Close v. Steel Co. of Wales, Ltd., [1961] 3 Weekly L.R. 319, 324, per
Lord Denning.
132. Id. at 326.
133. Cf. the views expressed by Lord Morton of Henryton in Hamilton v.
National Coal Board, [1960] 2 Weekly L.R. 313, 334-35. Note, 76 L.Q. REV.
478 (1960) suggests that if the act had intended a fence to guard the operator
against flying parts, it would have used the expression "sieve" rather than
"fence."
134. Sparrow v. Fairey Aviation Co., [1962] 3 Weekly L.R. 210 (lathe op-
erator injured when his hand was flung against the check of the lathe. This was
caused when a small hand tool held by him came into contact with the rotating
jaws of the lathe. Direct contact of the operator's hand with the jaws was im-
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Once it has been accepted that a "secure" fence need guard
the operator only against direct bodily contact with the danger-
ous part of the machine, further consequences follow quite logic-
ally.
(1) There is no need to guard a dangerous part against con-
tact with a hand-tool held by the worker, provided that it is
impossible for the worker's hand to come into direct contact
with the part of the machine.18 5
(2) It is at least open to doubt whether the occupier would
be liable if the worker is injured by the fence being thrown at
him as a result of the disintegration of the machine guarded by
it. The writer doubts whether the courts today would follow
Rutherford v. R. E. Glanville & Sons (Bovey Tracey) Ltd. 38
where the Court of Appeal had held the occupiers liable when
the plaintiff was struck by a guard which was displaced by a
disintegrating carborundum wheel. The court held that since it
was a foreseeable danger that the wheel might disintegrate, it
should have been securely guarded not only against the possi-
bility of direct contact but also so as to protect the worker from
being hit by parts of it. In the light of the House of Lords de-
cision in Close v. Steel Company of Wales, Ltd. it would appear
that the Rutherford case would be differently decided if it came
before the court today.
3. There exists a divergence of views as to whether ma-
chinery may be said to be dangerous within the meaning of sec-
tion 14 through conjunction with or juxtaposition with the
material on which the machinery is working. Some judges 3 7
favor the view that the presence of the material is not relevant
for the purpose of considering whether a machine is dangerous,
while a different view has been taken by others. 3 8 Both views
were carefully summed up by Holroyd Pearce, L.J., in Eaves v.
Morris Motors, Ltd.5 9 While Holroyd Pearce, L.J., favored the
possible because the jaws were covered by the metal discs on which the operator
was working). This decision has overruled the earlier case of Johnson v. J. Stone
& Co. (Charlton) Ltd., [1961] 1 Weekly L.R. 849.
135. Ibid.
136. [1958] 1 Weekly L.R. 415.
137. E.g., Ashworth, Jo, in Lewis v. High Duty Alloys Ltd., [1957] 1 Weekly
L.R. 632; Streatfield, J., in Sparrow v. Fairey Aviation Co., [1961] 1 Weekly
L.R. 844.
138. E.g., Finnemore, J., in Lenthall v. Gibson (unreported) ; Lynskey, J.,
in Hoare v. M. & W. Glasebrook, Ltd., [1957] 1 Weekly L.R. 638; Hincb-
eliffe, J., in Johnson v. J. Stone & Co. (Charlton) Ltd., [1961] 1 Weekly L.R.
849.
139. [1961] 3 Weekly L.R. 657, 663 (C.A.). A workman injured his finger
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latter interpretation, he appears to have received little support
from his fellow judges.
The defects of the law under the 1937 act (and retained
under the 1961 act) have been clearly summed up by Holroyd
Pearce, L.J., as follows :14
"Under the former Act 1 4 1 dangerous machinery had to be
fenced if danger might reasonably be anticipated from it. 42
Now dangerous machinery is only required by section 14 to be
fenced against danger of a particular and limited kind, namely
danger from workmen coming into contact with the machine.
There is no protection under section 14 against a class of ob-
vious perils caused by dangerous machinery, namely perils
which arise from a dangerous machine ejecting at the worker
pieces of material or even pieces of the machinery itself. Thus,
there is now left a gap which neither logic nor common sense
appears to justify."
What has happened to the Factories Act is something which
occurs frequently enough when the overgrowth of precedent
tends to hide the original aim of the legislature.143 The position
which we have reached now is clearly unsatisfactory and is one
which the courts themselves view with considerable disquiet.
The courts having been caught in the net of the logic of prece-
dent cannot by themselves find a way out and it is up to Parlia-
ment to take the next step. Fortunately, the common law as so
often before has proved more flexible and by relying on the
principle of reasonableness has kept open a door for the litigant
who is unable to obtain satisfaction under the act.
There exists general agreement that the present position is
unsatisfactory, but the agreement ends at this point. There
does not exist similar agreement on what should be done to rem-
on the rough burr of one of two bolts secured by nuts in a block on a milling
machine. The block, operated by hydraulic power, was supposed to stop for long
enough to enable the operator to remove the milled bolts. In this instance, how-
ever, the mechanism had broken down and the block moved on towards the prop-
erly guarded cutters. In withdrawing his hand quickly, the operator grazed his
finger on the burred bolt, the finger turned septic and had to be removed.
140. Id. at 664.
141. Factory and Workshop Act, 1901; 1 Edw. 7, c. 22.
142. Hindle v. Birtwistle, [1897] 1 Q.B. 192.
143. Referring to the interpretation given by the House of Lords to § 14(2)
of the act, Lord Denning said: "I am afraid one has to face the fact that it is a
fault of the interpretation which has been put on it by this House sitting judicial-
ly, which is infallible, which never makes a mistake and which can never correct
itself." 248 H.L. Rep. 73, cols. 1332-33 (25th April 1963).
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edy the situation. This came out clearly when the present state
of the law was debated in the House of Lords on 25th April
1963.
Lord Shepherd, who opened the debate, drew attention to the
recent decisions of the House of Lords in its judicial capacity
and pointed out that in 1960 out of 190,000 reported factory ac-
cidents no less than 2,500 were directly attributable to objects
flying out of a machine, either parts of the machine or particles
of the work which the machine was undertaking. 144 He referred
to the fact that mention of "direct contact" in section 14 (2) had
been included in the act for the first time in 1937 and that clear-
ly no one at the time had appreciated the significance of this
addition. The law had thus been changed inadvertently. He
suggested that the 1961 act be amended so as to extend the duty
under section 14 to all foreseeable accidents, whether caused by
direct contact or by injury from flying parts and that the Min-
ister of Labour be authorized to make regulations, where appro-
priate, allowing exemptions from the absolute duty in respect of
particular types of machines. 145 Lord Shepherd gained support
from two of the Law Lords, i.e., Lords Denning 146 and Evers-
hed. 147
The government case was put by Lord Hailsham. He agreed
that the present state of affairs was unsatisfactory but opposed
legislation on the lines proposed by Lord Shepherd on two
grounds.
1. To remove the offending words from section 14(2) of
the act would be a retrograde step, as it would make impossible
to use certain types of machinery, e.g., power presses, which
cannot be guarded by mechanical guards of the traditional
type. 4 8
2. Lord Hailsham agreed with another Law Lord (Lord
Reid) 149 who had spoken in the debate, that the main purpose
of the Factories Act was not that of providing means to work-
ing people to claim damages for injuries suffered, but rather
that of acting as a means of preventing factory accidents. Thus,
the main criterion in considering possible changes in the act
144. Id. col. 1322.
145. Id. cols. 1331-32.
146. Id. col. 1332 et seq.
147. Id. col. 1340 et seq.
148. Id. col. 1348.
149. Id. col. 1336.
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should be "What is most likely to prevent accidents" rather than
"What is going to make it most easy to collect compensation
after they have happened." 150 Lords Hailsham and Reid argued
that an amendment to the act on the lines suggested by Lords
Shepherd, Denning, and Evershed would make it more difficult
to decide whether a guard was a secure one as it would sub-
stantially increase the number of hazards against which the
guard was to protect the operative.
Lord Hailsham suggested, therefore, that the flaws in the
law which had been discovered should be remedied by a judicious
use of the powers of the Minister of Labour to make regula-
tions, both under section 14(6) in respect of the fencing of
materials and under section 76(1) in respect of any machinery
or process which could cause risk of bodily injury. 15 ' He added
the further information that regulations in respect of the fenc-
ing of abrasive wheels were shortly to be published in draft
form and that the revision of the existing regulations dealing
with woodworking machinery and the protection of eyes were
under active consideration.
There the matter rests at present. Lord Shepherd's motion
was by the leave of the House withdrawn since its main pur-
pose (i.e., the ventilation of grievances) had been fulfilled.
What the debate has shown once again is the difficulty of legis-
lating in precise terms for a variety of contingencies. Perhaps
there is a great deal of truth in the point raised by Lord Reid
that the prime purpose of the act is that of preventing accidents
by laying down a code of safety provisions. If these tend to
become so complicated that the most conscientious employer
finds difficulty in observing them and thus risks a fine of up
to £300152 for each infringement, much of the value of the act
has disappeared. As far as the position of the injured workman
is concerned, could not his rights be adequately protected if the
law relating to negligence were codified, even if in part only,
with perhaps the principle of res ipsa loquitur made applicable
to accidents of the type discussed in this paper?
150. Id. col. 1338.
151. "The advantages of regulations are that they can be adapted to the
particular circumstances of each machine. They are precise and lay down abso-
lute, unqualified requirements where absolute and unqualified requirements are
appropriate and they can make less stringent provisions in cases of difficulty."
Id. col. 1355.
152. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 156(2).
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